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STATEMENT· OF FACTS. 
A taxicab owned and driven by plaintiff, .Jacob B: Hinkle, 
was involved in a head-on collision with an automobile owned 
by defendant Smith and operated by his agent, defendant 
Carter. This action occurred in Allegheny County, Virginia, 
on U. S. Route 60, approximately 7% miles west of the Town 
of° Covington, on December 20, 1946. As a proximate result 
of this accident, Hinkle suffered personal injuries, his taxicab 
was damaged and he was unable to use it as such for some 
period of time. , · 
On January 16, 1947, plaintiff Hinkle caused a warrant to 
he issued by the Trial Justice of Allegheny County summon-
ing the defendant Smith to answer 11is complaint upon a claim 
of money in the sum of One Thousand ($1,000) Dollars, rep-
resenting Seven Hundred and Fifty ($750) Dollars damages 
to plaintiff's automobile and Two Hundred and I•1ifty ($250) 
Dollars damages for loss of use of the automobile. This war-
rant was duly served upon defendant Smith and, on January 
30, 1947, judgment was rendered by the Trial .Justice in fa-
vor of the plaintiff in the amount sued for, with interest and 
costs. On February 10, 1947, execution was issued. On Feb-
ruary 12, 1947, the judgment was paid and the plaintiff made 
the following endorsement on the judgment docket of the 
Trial Justice Court: "Paid iii full for judgment-February 
12, 1947," signed "Jacob B. Hinkle". 
3• 9 Jt is not disputed that the recovery liad by Hinkle 
was on a cause of action which arose out of the same ac-
cident as is involved in this suit. On March 15, 1947, plaintiff 
instituted the instant suit by notice of motion served on de-
fendant Smith in the City of Richmond, and, as provided by 
law, by service on the Director of the Division of Motor Ve-
hicles as to defendant Carter. On the return clay, April 15, 
1947, defendant filed pleas to the general issue and special 
pleas sfltting forth the former juclbrment and the satisfaction 
thereof, as a bar to the maintenance of the present suit. De-
fendants maintained tliat the injuries to plaintit'f 's person 
and to his property were the result of the same alle,:i:ed t.or-
tious act and that the plaintiff had but one cause of nction; 
that plaintiff could not split a single cause of action and 
maintain two suits, one for his property damage and one for 
personal injuries; and that there was an estoppel by judg-
ment against the maintenance of the present suit. 
·To· these pleas plaintiff demurred and assigned the follow-
ing reasons; 
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(1) That two causes of action accrued to plaintiff as a re-
sult of the automobile accident.· · 
(2) That the. judgment obtained in the Trial Justice Court 
was a void judgment because service was not properly h~d 
pn the .def~~dant~ {In. demurring. to the special plea- of ae-
fendant Carter, . plambff also assigned the reason that the 
judgment against defe1idant Smith was n6t a bar to an. ab-
tion against defendant Carter. This ground was later abri:h-
~ood) · 
4• f)Both defendants then moved to strike from plaintiff's 
demurrer the allegation that the prior judgment ,vas 
void, assigning the following reasons: 
(1) That the demutrer alleged a new fact, ,vas a denial of 
a fact admitted by the plaintiff's demurrer, and isas not 
pleaded in the alternative; 
{2) That the plaintiff procured the judgment and was 
estopped from denying its validity; imu . 
(8) That if tl1e service was defective it was cured b;v a 
general appearance of the defendant on a motion to vacate 
the judgment. 
The ciemurrei· arid the dcfonclants' motion to stril.e WCf(' 
argued before the trial coui·t and briefs submitted. After 
deliberation the court. rendered its opinion (set forth oh page 
22 of the record) in whicb defendants' motion to strike was 
granted, out plaintiff's demurrer to tbe special pleas were 
sustnined on the ground that more tl1art one cause of action 
arose to the plaintiff as the i·esult of. a single tortious net i.n-
volving injuries both to his pro1jerty and his person; . A11 
order was eritered ih co1iforn1ity with this opihioni to which 
action def eridants duly excepted. The case theh came on to 
trial before a jury; February 28, 1948. A verdict wns re-
turned in favor of plaintiff in the f.um of One. Thousand 
($1,000) Dollars. Defendants movecl to set asi,le. the ver-
dict ns being contrary to the law and. evidence, and for tH'ror 
of the court iii sustaining plnintiff 's demurrer to the spe-
5• · cial plea of each defendant. This motion was. ~ove:rr~led 
and the court eritered judgment on the 23i·cl day of Feb:. 
ruary, 1948, in accordance with the verclict of the jury. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
The court ehed in sustaining plaintiff's demuri:er to tlP-
f endants' special plea and in failing to set -aside the verdict 
of the jury. 
4 
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QUESTION OF LAW. 
The sole question of law involved in this case is whether 
one who has suffered both damage to his property and ·in-
jury to his person as a result of a single tortious act can 
maintain separate actions at law to recover each item of 
damages. 
ARGUMENT. 
This question has never been directly consi<lerP,d by tbh: 
court. It has been decided by the highest court'l of thirty-
two of tl1e other forty-seven states. It is one of ~rent im-
portance in this automotive age. As tlie court is doubtless 
aware, the largest group of cases litig·ated todav arises di-
rectly out of automobile accidents. A large p<>rcentage of 
automobile negligence cases involve claims by a i-:ingle plain .. 
tiff for both personal injuries and dumage to his automohile. 
Of the thirty-two states whose courts have pas'lc<l on this 
question, twenty-four have adopted 1he rule: 
6t) ., 'A single tortious act causing both pcrsonul injury 
and property damage to a person gives rise to but one 
indivisible cause of action.'' 
From this conclusion the courts have applied th0 univer-
sally accepted rule that a recovery of any part of the dam-
ages resulting from an indivisible cause of action, is a com-
plete bar to any future suit for the omitted items of dawn~<'. 
Jones v. Morris Plan Bank, 168 Va. 284, 191 S. E. (108 (1939). 
Of the eight courts wbo have adopted the minority rufo 
that two distinct causes of action arise from the c;nmc ne{t'Ji-
gent act, and that more than one suit may be maintained ·for 
the separate items of damage, three ( Calif ornin, l\[ontnna. 
and Oregon) have reached this conclusion by construction of 
procedural statutes peculiar to those jurisdictions. The rea-
soning of the remaining five (New York, New .Jersey, Texa~, 
Illinois, and Qhio) is presented in t!mTrial Court's opinim1 
and considered hereafter. · 
Majority Rule. 
The majority rule has been adopted in the following twenty-
four states: 
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Alabama 
Arizona 
Georgia 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Maine 
Massachusetts 
Minnesota 
.Mississippi 
Michigan 
Missouri . 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Oklahoma 
Pennsylvania 
South Carolina 
South Dakota 
Tennessee 
Utah 
Vermont 
Washington 
Wisconsin 
West Virginia 
Wyoming 
(As we do not wish to burden our argument with the cita-
tjons necessary to support the foregoing statement they may 
be found in the appendix at page 26 hereof.) · 
7e 8 The majority rule is based on the follow:ng consid-
erations: 
(1) The cause of action consists of the negligent act which 
produces the effect, ratl~er than in the conseqncnres of the 
act. 
(2) Valid and imp.ortant considerations of public poliey. 
forbid a multiplicity of suits when all matters between the 
parHes can be litigated in one action. 
We shall consider each of these considerations in light of 
the leading cases from other jurisdictions; show that they 
are considerations which compel the adoption of t11P. niajority 
rule; and demonstrate that this court is committed to boLh. 
A. What Is a Cause of Actio11,F 
The courts adopting the majority rule are uniformly of 
the opinion that it is the wrongful act that gives rise to cause 
of action and not the com;equences of the a~t as they nfl'ect 
property and personal security, . 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted the majority 
rule in the case of Fields v. Pltiladelpliia Rapid Transit Co., 
273 Pa. 282, 117 A 59 (1922).' In rejecting the minority rule 
the court said at page 60 of the 'Atluntic ReportP.1': · 
· "It, therefore, becomes necessary to determine what con-
stitutes the cause of action in Pennsylvania. Is it the viola-
tion of the dutv which the defendant owes to exercise due 
care, or damage which flows from · the wrong f This court 
has defined it to be e "' "' 'the negligent act or acts which oc-
casioned the injury' .... It 'is that which produces .or effects 
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the results complained of' © 3 ;; • And these declarations 
are in accord with the reasoning of the earlier authorities. 
4,\ e e The exact point here in question does not seem to 
ge have been discussed *in anv of our decided Cflses, but the 
controlling principle has 'been fixed, as !":tated. It is, 
however, a matter of coJllmon knowledge that tlrc in<'1usion in 
one suit of claims for injury to property destroyPd, and pe·r-
sonal damages inflicted at tl1e same time, is customary. Many 
authorities· can be ref erred to in which both classes of de-
mands were joined, and the right was unquestioned. ·)) "' ...,_ If 
the cause of action is the wrongful act, and we so hold, tnen 
all of the damages sustained thereby, whctl1er to person or 
property, are properly sought in one suit. A plaintiff is 
l1ound by his former recovery for a part, and ~annot maintain 
a second action for an item whicl1 he saw fit to 0mit, in the 
absence of some special circumstances exC'using tl1e neglect. 
$ c 0 It matters not that the first suit was brought~ as here, 
in a court of limited jurisdiction. ,i;. e e " (Citations omitted.) 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of our sister etat:c, '\Vest 
· Virginia, recently had occasion to adopt the majority rule in 
a suit involving damage to plaintiff's automobile and injµries 
to her person. The court said: 
"Plain.tiff's ca.use. of action was the w:,qli,qmit act of rle-
fendoot. The injury to l10r automobile and her pel'~on were 
the results of the negligent act and constituted separate c~le-
ments of damage recoverable by her." Larzo v. Su:ift & Co., 
..... ,v. Va ..... , 40 S. E. (2d) 811, at page 814 (.ta-!Ci). (Ital-
ics supplied.) 
One of the leading early cases supporting the majority rule 
contains the following statement: 
"We are of tljc opinion that the cause of the action consists 
of the negligent net which produced the effect, rather than 
ju the effect of t11c act in its application to different J)rimary 
rights, and that the injury tQ the person and property os n. 
result of the original cause gives rise to different items of 
damage. The natural rights mentioned in '"the Consti-
9* tution and statutes arc of a personal clmraeter, all cen-
tering in the person; and the enactments rPferrccl to are 
intended to preserve thm under the various phases of life, 
in the most practicable manner, as viewed by tl!e legislature. 
But, because the distinction in reference to persoual and prop-
erty rights has been made, as noti_ced by respondent, it does 
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not follow that tl1ose statutes were intended to definitely pro-
vide for separate remedies under the circumstances presented 
in this case." K in.<J v. Chicago, 111 ilwaitkee and Sf. Paul R. 
Co., 80 Minn. 83, 82 N. ,v. 1113, 50 L. R. A .. 161, at page 168 
(1900). 
l\fost of tlie courts _adopting· the majority l'lll~ lmve defined 
"cause of action" ( either explicitly or impfo:itly) as tho 
wrong which pro<luces tho injuries complained vf. The South 
Carolina court ronches the same result by defining the cause 
of action as "the right ch1imed or wrong ~nfferecl by the 
plaintiff' on the one band ancl tho duty or deHct of tho de-
fendant on the othei:". ""Jn, the case of lfolcmnlw , .. Garland 
a,nd Denwiddie, 162 S. C. 379,160 S. E. 881, at yage 88:l (1931), 
the court applies this definition to a highway accident: 
"Applying this rule to the facts of this rai-;<•, it nppeftrs 
that the plaintiff was using the highway, which he had a right 
to do, in safety. That defendant \';rongfully im·acled that 
right by driving his automobile against the Wi0.g-on in which 
plaintiff was driving. Here the cause of action is ••omplcte; 
plaintiff's primary right to be on tho highway combined with 
defendant's wrongful act of invasion of that ,·ight. A single 
cause of action. But it is argued that plaintiff suffered dam-
ages not only to his person but to his prop1:n-ty for which 
he is entitled to damages, and he is <>ntitle<l tn punitive dam-
ages for defendant's willful cohduct. If ull th:li be conceded, 
it remains true that the remedy is no pln-l of the cause 
10(~ of action. The plaintiff may in one aetion "cleclnrc upon 
each one of his claims for damages. He may not harasi:; 
defendant with a multiplicity of suits by makin~ of each ele-
ment of damag·e a separate cause of action.'' 
The case of 1J,J crcer, .Administrat'.Jr, v. City 11/ llit:ltmon,l, 
152 Va. 736, indicates that this court takes the smne view of 
the meaning of "cause of action" as those jurisdietions which 
have adopted the majority rule. The court thE're cites with 
approval the.definition: 
''The cause of action arises when tl1at is 11ot .Jone which 
ought to have been done or that is done which ought not to 
be done.'' (Id., p. 7 44.) 
In that case plaintiff's ,decedent, <lui·ing her lifetime, had 
given the defendant city notice of n claim for peri:;onal in-
juries as required by the city charter. Aft,fr decedent's 
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death as a proximate result of these injuries, p]r.intiff quali" 
fled as administrator and brought suit for wrongful death 
without giving notice within (iO days of hi~ qu11lification. De-
fendant demurred to plaintiff's noticu of motion on the g1·ound 
that plaintiff had not given the city notice of his claim 
"within sixty days after· such cause of action ehall have ac-
crued". It was the city's contention that 1,hil11tiff's cause 
of action accrued with his appointment as adniinh;trator. In 
overruling this contention the court said: 
"The cause of action accrued at the time of the injury. +i » ~ • 
The right of action referred to in the ca~es i~ entirely dif-
ferent from the cause of action and the i·ight of nction does 
not accrue to the c]aimant or anv one.' else until the terms of 
the statute have been complieci with. The administrntor 
had no right of action until he qualified, flJl(l then ,,only 
11 • if the terms of the statute bad been comp]i.crl with." (Id., 
p. 743.) 
"The difficultr, we think! grows out of a confusion of 
terms, an inaccuracy of speech, owing to the faet that in most 
cases the cause of action and the right of ~ction arise :it the 
same time and affect or belong to the same pE>rso1t. But here 
the situation is altogether different. Death i.~ 11ot ,,. cause 
but a cmisequence. In other words, the cause o.f action ac-
crues upon the occurrin,g of the aocident, whort•as the right 
of action does not arise until the required notice has been 
given, and under tbe statute of limitations thr-1'<.' can be no 
right of action in any case after one year from the time when 
the cause of action (injury) occurred." (ItJ., p. i-l6.) (Italics 
·supplied.) 
The case of Hite v. Lon-g, 6 Rand. 45i (]8:!S), shows that 
at an early date the court was looking toward the tortious 
act rather tlian its consequences in determiuin~ what is an 
indivisible cause of action. In that cas(' plaintiff brought au 
action in trespass for damages: 
(1) for wrongfully stopping his wagon and. team; and 
(2) taking therefrom one of the horses. 
Defendant set up as a plea in bar a judgmc'llt in his favor 
rendered in an action in trover for the same ht,rse. In hold-
ing this plea a bar to the instant suit the court said: 
'' This would close the question, it seems to me, so far as 
to the trespass in taking away the horse, but he nlso stopped 
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the team of the plaintiff of which this horse was one. 1t ~11 
all one act though and one cause of action-. The party c.>an go 
for the whole in trespass or he muy elect to sue in trover or 
detinue. TVe do not see lzow lie can sever one ,·aww of action, 
and carve two suits out of it." (Id., p. 463.) (Italics sup-
plied.) · 
128 0 The case of Yirgi11ia Railway cf Power Company v .. 
Leland, 143 Va. 920, 129 S. :K 700 (1925), cited by the 
trial court involved a suit for perso11al injuries instituted after 
a judgment in a suit for property darnuge, but it is not con-
trolling on its facts. On page !}30 of the Virginia Report 
there is a statement that indicates that the court considered 
that the acC'iclent itself (the wrongful act) constituted the 
cause of action. There the court said: 
"The judgment of the court detcrminctl that the joint. neg-
ligence of the plaintiff and Carnohan was the proximate 
cause of the collision or was conclusive of any right of re-
covery of either or both of them in any other action based 
upon the same cause of action." (Italics supplied.) 
B. It Is Public Policy to Avoid a 1llultiplicity of Suits. 
The rule against spHtting causes of action is based on pub-
lic policy. It is to the interest of the state to end litigation; 
Our courts do not pay for themselves. Unnecessary litiga-
tion is costly to the public as well as the litigants. At times 
our civil dockets are so heavy that the courts cannot act on 
all causes with the promptness they deserve. If two suits 
ure permitted where one can conclusively settle all mnttei·H 
in controversy, the dockets are unnecessarily burdened. 
The rule is likewise founded in the elementary principle 
of justice, that no mun should be twice harassed for the same 
debt. This is as much a part of the American sense of fair 
play as the principle that one should not kick a man when he 
is. down. The greatest part of the tort cases tried today is 
derived from automobile accidents where usually the 
13e worst that can be truthfully said •against the defendant 
is that he failed to foresee an accdient. One who un-
. t ntionally commits what the. 'law bas classified as a wrong 
ht not to be twice subjected to the expense, worry and 
mHitation of a law suit when the injured purty can obtain 
plete relief in a single action. 
These considerations of public policy and justice are the 
basis for the majority rule. Recently the Supreme Court of 
10 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginin 
· Kansas adopted the majority rule and cited with approval 
this often quoted statement from Clark on Code Pleading: 
"A rule leading to two lawsuits where one will accomplish 
the same results is not to be favored." Fiscus v. Kansas City 
Public Service Co., 153 Kan. 493, 112 P. (2d) 83 (1941). 
The court in Pillsbury v. Kesslen, Slioe Co., 136 l\Ie. 235, 7 
A. (2d) 898 (1939), after citing several of its own cases goes 
on to say: 
"These cases are indications of the natural aversion of 
the court to protracted litigation and multiplicity of action. 
It is against public policy that controversies should not have 
an end; the public should not be called upon to bear the ex-
pense of two trials where one will suffice. Nor should parties 
be called on to pay the bills for two suits where only one is 
necessary. · 
"The decided we_igl1t of authority is'that in such a case as 
the one now before us there is but one rause of action with 
different elements of damage arising from it and that the 
.recovery of a judgment for personal injuries is a bar to an 
action for property damage occasioned by the same acci-
dent." (7 A. (2d) 899). 
· In Jones v. 11f orris Plan Bank, 168 Va. 284, Hll S. E. 608 
(1937), this court cites with approval and quotes at 
±
length from Corpus ,Juris ,iiSecunclum. .A,s the quoted· 
language is particularly pertinent to the issue now be-
the court, we here repeat it: 
"In I Corpus Juris Secundum, ·'Actions', paragraph 102, · 
page 1308, it is said: 'The object of tbe rule against splitting 
causes of action is to prevent a multiplicity of suits. The 
law does not favor such a multipljcity; instead it favors any 
action that will prevent other actions involving the same 
transaction. The rule exists mainly for the protection of de-
fendant, is intended to suppress i;erious grievances, and is 
applied to prevent vexatious litigation and to avoid the costs 
imd expenses incident to numerous suits on the same cause 
of action. It is based on the maxims, biterest repulicae ut sit 
finis litium, (It concerns the commonwealth that there be a 
limit to litigation), nnd Nemo debet his ·vexair pro mia, et 
r,adem cause (No one ought to twice vexed for one and tl1e 
same cause).' " 
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"Again in the same work and volume at page 1:,09 the na-
ture of the rule is said to be: 'The rule ugainst splitting 
causes of action is based on principles of public policy. It 
· is a salutary principle. It is n rule of justice, not to be 
classed among technicalities, and is not altogether a rule of 
original legal right, but is rather an equitnble interposition 
of the courts to prevent a multiplicity of suits through rea-
sons of public policy. As a defense it is not an estoppel, but 
a bar. ' '' ( 168 Va. 292.) 
C. Opinion of Trial Court. 
The hial court in ruling on plaintiff's demurrers to the 
special pleas of the defendants has correctly stated the ls-
sue. It is defendants' contention, however, that it reached a 
conclusion contrary to the great weight of authority in this 
country, and contrary to the position heretofore taken by this 
Honorable Court. As we have shown above this court's 
15e definition of "cause of action" and its Zlnnounced \Tlpol-
icy against a multiplicity of actions require the. adop-
tion of the majority rule. The trial court adopts the En-
glish, or minority, rule that a single negligent act causing 
damages simultaneously to the person and property of the 
plaintiff creates in him two separate and distinct causes of 
action. The court's reasons for adopting this rule are: 
(1) Section 2 of the Code of Virginia which provides: 
"The common law of England • • * sl1all continue to be 
in force within the (state), and be the rule of decision ° • • . '' 
(2) It attempts to show that at early common law damages 
for personal injuries would have to be recovered in an action 
· of trespass on the case, while damages to the property woultl 
have to be recovered by trespass vi et armis. It makes this 
distinction on the assumption that the personal injuries are 
consequential and the property damage immediate. It then 
goes on to show that prior to the enactment of what is now 
Section 608G of the Virginia Code trespass and case coulcl 
not be joined in the same action and failure to bring suit in 
the proper form of action was subject to demurrer. 
( 3) It deduces from certain statutory differences in the 
remedies ancl supposed inconveniences in judicial adminis-
tration that there is a fundamental differei1ce between the 
claim for property damage and personal injury.· 
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We shall consider each of these arguments in the order 
listed. 
(1) Section 2 of the Virginia Code is not controlling. As 
the trial court itself points out, this section is a re-enact-
ment of a provision first adopted by the Virginia Conven-
tion of May, 1776. It has been re-enacted at every Code 
rn• revision since then. The obvious 8 purpose of the en-
actment at that time was to bring into the body of Vir-
ginia law the hundreds of years of legal experience and de-
cision tl1at had belonged to Virginia as a colony but, with-
out statutory authority, would presumably die at the creation 
of an independent state. ,ve do not suppose that it was the 
intention of the 1776 convention to bind the judiciary to fol-
low blindly the pronouncements of the English courts made 
after that date. And it was indisputably left to our own 
courts to determine what was the common law. In re-enact-
ing this provision in subsequent years, the Legislature did 
not intend to expand its scope. 
If, prior to a judicial pronouncement on. a common law 
question by the courts of England, our own courts have de-
termined for themselves what the common law is, we do not 
suppose it is their duty under this Code section to change 
the rule that they have adopted to make it accord with the 
English view. · 
The English case of Brunsden v. Hmnphrey (1884), L. R. 
14 Q. B. Div. 141, which first lays down the. minority rule, 
was decided 108 years after the adoption of the Code provi-
sion in question by a divided court which reversed the de-
cision of the trial court. As we have attempted to show here-
tofore in this brief, the Virginia court ]1ad committed itself 
to the theory and reasoning of the majority rule before this 
English decision. 
As was held in Marks v. ·11Iorris, 4 Hen. & :M. 463 (1809), in · 
adopting tlie common law we did not adopt the decisions of 
the English courts and they are not binding as authorities. 
Accord: Livfogston , •. Jefferson., Fed. Cas. No. 8411 (C. C. 
Va. 1811). 
· 17• •(2) If there ever existed a common law rule that 
damages to person and property of a single person, 
caused by one negligent act, consisted of two separate causes 
of action, this rule has been changed by the development of 
the common law. 
It is a fundamental maxim of common law jurisprudence· 
that the common law is never static and changes to meet the 
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needs of a developing society. A glance at the history of the 
development of the common law forms of action is sufficient 
proof of the truth of this axiom. 
It is true as pointed out by the Trial Judge in bis opinion, 
that the old common law made a rather fine distinction be-
tween trespass and case. If the plaintiff's damages were 
immediate he must bring his action in trespass ; if they were 
consequential case was his only remedy. Virginia's great 
legal scholar, John B. Minor, in his work 1\finor's Institutes, 
bas defined trespass 1•i et armis, and trespass on the case as 
follows: 
"The action of trespass 1,i et armi~, or of trespass, us it· 
is commonly called, is employed. to recover damage for in-
juries to persons or to property which result directly from 
forces applied ( either of purpose or for want of care) by the 
wrongdoer.'' 
• • 
"The action of trespass on the case is· at common law prop-
erly applicable to recover damages for injuries to persons or 
property which do not result immediately from forces ap-
plied by the wrong-doer without reference to the question 
whether the force was of purpose or by accident occasioned 
by neg~gence. '' 
( 4 Minor's Institutes, 3rd Ed., p. 436.) 
In the case of Jordon v. Wyatt, 4 Gratt. 151 (1847)., 
18* this court ,;)defined the meaning of the words "imme-
diate" and "consequential-" as used in the distinc~tion 
between trespass and case. The court said at page 154: 
"The terms 'immediate' and 'consequential' should, as I 
can see, be understood, not in reference to the time which 
the accident occurred, or the space through which it passed, 
or the pface from which it is begun, or the intention with 
· which it is done, or tlrn instrument or agent employed, or the 
lawfulness or unlawfulness of the act; hut in referen<'c to. 
the progress and clete.rminat!on of the act, to its being clown 
on the one hnnd and its havmg been down on the other. If 
the injury is inflicted by the act, at any moment of its prog-
ress from the commencement to the termination thereof then 
the injury is direct or immediate but if it arises nfter the act 
- has been completed, t11ough occasioned by the act, then it is 
consequential or collatt>ral, or more exactly collateral ronse-
quence. '' · 
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To state the matter in another way~ trespass lies wherever 
the act itself caused the injury; case where the consequence 
of the act caused the injury. Thus to use the illustration 
used by the court in the last cited case, if I throw a log into 
the road and bit a man, his action is in trespass ; if when I 
throw the log into the road it hurts no one but sometime later 
someone drives along the road and is injured by hitting the 
log, his action is in case. The ref ore, it wo.ulcl seem that the 
trial court's conclusion that the property damage is "imme-
diate" and the personal injury "consequential" in a head-on 
automobile collision appears to be not in accordance with the 
common law as determined bv this court: 
The enactment in 1849 of ,vhat is now· Section 6086 of the 
Virginia Code, permitting case wherever trespass would lie 
at common law mav have been motivated bv several con-
. 19• siderations. One ·of t11em must 8 have been the public 
policy to avoid multifarious litigation. 
Since 1849 an injured party has had, indisputably, one 
t:emedy at which he can obtain at one and the sam~ time da~-
age for both person and property caused by the smgle negli-
gent act of the wrongdoer. It has been the almost universal 
practice of litigants to present their claims for damages to 
person and property in the same suit. It is the generally ac-
cepted belief of both bench and bar that plaintiff has but a 
i;ingle cause of action. Likewise this court has, on numerous 
occasions indicated that it wiH not countenance two suits when 
all of the issues can be decided in one. 
It is defendants' contention that the common law 1·ule is 
t.hat there is but a single cause of action, and that this has 
been the rule in Virginia since before the enactment of wl1at 
is now Section 6086. In fact, one of the few American comt~ 
that have adopted the English, or minority, rule makes th~ 
statement: 
"The rule at common law and in a majority of the states· 
of tbe1union is that damages resulting from a single wrong-
ful act, even though they include both property and persc,nal 
injuries, are, when suffered by the same person, the subject 
of only one act a~ainst the wrongdoer." Vasu v. Kohlers, 
J45 Ohio St. ~21, 61 N. E. (2d) 707, 166 A. L. R. 855 at p. 860. 
(Italics supplied.) . 
(3) In addition to the reasons diseussed above, the trial 
rourt supports its conclusion by the argument that a cause of 
action for property damage may be assigned but a cause of 
action for personal injuries may not; that 1he latter action 
abates with tl1e death of the injured party while the former 
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survives; and that the Legislature 0 has set a different 
209 period of limitations to the remedy for each type of 
damage. There are obvious reasons totally unconuectc<l 
with the question here at issue for these distinctions. 
At common. law t1ie assignment of non-negotiable choses in 
action was regarded ns a transaction which savored of 
champerty and maintenance, and was not allowed. This rule 
was soon modified in favor of choses in action arising ea.: 
co1itractu. Actions ex dcliclo in which the defendant's plea 
was "not guilty" did not _survive until the common law was 
modified by the early statute of 4 lndw. III, Ch. 7. This act 
6"8.Ve a remedy to the personul representatives of a decedent 
for trespass to the person~l estate. By a later statute this 
remedy was extended to inr.Jnde injuries to real property ol' 
the decedent. These statutes which permitted the survival ot' 
choses in action for damages to property gave rise . to the 
principle that this type of tort claim could be assigned while 
a claim for personal injuries could not. There was no such 
distinction in t]1e early common law and it is clear that the 
property considerations which caused the enactment of the 
statutes referred to., are not here controlling. A similar ar-
gument was made to the :i\lassachusetts court in the case of 
Dea.rde11, v. lley, 304 :Mass. 659, 24 N. E. (2nd) 644, 127 A. L. R. 
1077 (1939), to induce it to change its position from the ma-
jority rule. The court said: · , 
"But our rule of law as to assignments of this character 
is nothing new, and the reason for it is not found in any con-
sideration of the cause of action itself." 
The argument that the Legislature hacl fixed different pe-
riods of liJl}itation for the recovery of damages to prop-
210 erty and for personal einjuries wai;; also made in the 
case just cited. It was contended that this showed a 
legislative intent to distinguish property ri~d1ts and personal 
rights, and that the legislatnre regoarded their invasion as 
giving rise to separate causes of action. The court said: 
"We do not think that this conclusion follows. The cause 
of action is still the tortious act from whirh both the personal 
injury and the property damage result. The rause of action 
was recognized at common law and is not a creature Qf stat-
ute. The limitation wifhin which the action may be brought 
is a mere restriction upon the remedy. It is not a limitation 
upon the right itself.'' 
This court has said much the same thing in the case of 
Mercer v. Richmond, supra, where the court said: 
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'' Cause of action has a well defined legal meaning and the 
Legislature could not, if it would, make a movable feast of 
it." (152 Va. 736, 744.) 
·or as was said in Lewis v. Glenn, 84 Va. 947, 979, 6 S. E. 
822 (1888): 
"Statutes of limitations do not affect the cause of action, 
hut take away the right.'' 
To the argument that because of these differences between 
a claim for property damages and a claim for personal in-
juries that it would be impracticable and inconvenient in the· 
administration of justice to blend tlie two, the best answer is 
the general practice of the bar of this state. ,v e believe it 
undisputed that the great majority of cases involving both 
personal injury and property damage are adjudicated in one 
· suit and the lawyers never consider the advisability of sepa-
rate suits. ,v e are not aware of any insurmountable 
22 9 einconvenience caused by this practice. If necessary a 
special verdict can be obtained ascertaining that part of 
the damages awarded to plaintiff for property damage and 
that part compensating him for his personal injuries. Courts 
adopting the majority rule have had no difficulty in protecting 
hoth the assignor and the assignee when the property damage 
. part of the claim has been assigned. They ]mve not a11 
adopted the same legal r<>asoning but the results are sub-
stantially the same and equitable to both parties, as we11 as 
protecting the defendant from a multiplicity of suits when 
such is totally unnecessary. · 
The test laid clown bv this court in Jones v. Morris Plan 
Rank, supra, as to whether n cause of action is single or di-
visible is the identity of the evidence to prove the matters in 
controversy. Like many sin1ilar }('gal tests, it is one that can 
he applied on both sides of the question. Thus both tlie ma-
.iority and minority decisions Jmve applied the test of simi-
larity of evidence to determiiw whether or not a single neg-
ligent act causing both personal injury and prop('rty damage 
gives rise to one or two causes of action. The minority adopt 
the tenuous line of reasoning that because additional evidence 
of a somewhat different nntnre is necessary to prove a claim 
for personal injuries that there are two causes of action. 
1.,ollowing tl1is line of reasoning to its logical conclusion, plain-
tiff in the instant case should be entitled to maintain sepa-
rate actions for property damage to his automobile and for 
the loss of its use ns a taxicab. Obviouslv it takes somewhat 
<liff erent evidence to pro~·e bot11 claims. The true meaning of 
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this test is whether the operative facts that determine liability 
as distinguished from damages are identical. Thus it 
23° takes ~the same proof of negligence to hold the defend-
ant liable for the property damage as it does to hold 
him for the personal injuries. . 
The dissenting opinion of Chief .Justice Colendge in the 
English case of Brnnsden v. Humphrey, supra, effectively 
points out the fallacy of the minority view: 
" 'It appears to me that whether the negligence of the 
servant, or the impact of tlie vehicle which the servant drove, 
be the technical cause of action, equally the cause is one and 
the same; that the injury done to the plaintiff is injury done 
to him at one and the same moment by· one and the same act 
iu respect of different rights (i. e., his person and his goods), 
I do not in the least deny; but if seems to me a subtletz1 not 
warranted by law to hold that a man cannot bring two actions 
if he is i11.jured iti his arm and in his leg, but can br-in.(J two, 
if besides his arm and leg bei1l.Q injuredr l,.is trousers wkiclt, 
contain his leg, and his coat sleeve which contains his arm, 
have been torn.' "' $ "' '\Ve are of the opinion that the cause 
of the action consists of the negligent act which produced the 
effect, rather than in the effect of the act in its application to 
different primary rights, and that the injury to the person 
and property as a result of the ·original eause gives rise to 
different items of damage." (Italics supplied.) 
COKCLUSION. 
,v e submit that the weight. of authority, the eommon Jaw of 
this state., public policy, justice, and practical considerations 
all compel the adoption of the majority rule that plaintiff lm<l 
but one indivisible caui;;e of action for damage to his prop-
erty and injury to his person caused by defendants' single 
negligent act. That being so defendants' speeial pleas con-
stituted a complete bar to this action and the tripl court erred· 
in sustaining plaintiff's demurrers and in refusing to set aside 
the jury's verdict. · 
24a "IN CONSIDERATION ,vREREOF, your petition-
ers pray that they may be awarded a writ of error and 
supersedeas to the judgment entered bv the Cireuit Court of 
Allegheny County, Virginia, on the 23rd day of February, 
1948; that said judgment may be reviewed and 1•eversed by 
this Honorable court and that final judgment may be by it 
here entered for the defendant. 
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Petitioners· respectfully request that their counsel be al-
lowed an opportunity to state orally why a writ of error should 
be granted. · 
In the event a writ of error is awarded, petitioners request 
that this petition be printed wit~ the record in lieu of a sepa-
rate brief on their behalf. 
· And your petitioners will ever pray, etc. 
Respectfully, 
BISHOP CARTER and 
THOMAS "WILLIAM SMITH, JR., 
By Counsel, 
LEONARD G. :MUSE, 
SIDNEY F. PARHAM, JR., 
Of Counsel. 
WOODS, ROGERS, MUSE & "r ALKER, 
Attorneys for Petitioners., 
302-319 Boxley Building, 
Roanoke, Virginia. 
25• •1, Sidney F. Parham, Jr., of the City of Roanoke, 
Virginia, an attorney at law practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that in my opinion 
the judgment complained of in the foregoing petition should 
be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
Given under my hand this 16th day of June, 1948. 
SIDNEY F. PARHAM, JR. 
CERTIFICATE OF ~[AILING PETITION TO OPPOSING 
COUNSEL. . 
I, Sidney F. Parham, .Tr., of counsel for the petitioners, 
Bishop Carter and Thomas William Smith, .Tr., do hereby 
certify that a· copy of this petition was mailed, with postage 
prepaid, this 16th day of June, 1948, to ,T. C. Goodwin of 
Clifton Forge, Va., who appeared on belmlf of the plaintiff, 
Jacob B. Hinkle, in the trial court. 
The original petition will be presented to Justice Herbert 
B. Gregory of tlie Supreme Court of Appeals at his office in 
the :Municipal Building, Roanoke, Virginia, on June 16, 1948, 
at 10 o'cloc)c A. M. · 
SIDNEY F. PARHAM, JR. 
Filed 6-16-48. 
H. B._G. 
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Writ of error and super.iedeas awarded. Bond $1,500.00 
Aug. 16, 1948. 
H.B. G. 
Received August 18, 1948. 
l\L B. W. 
*APPENDIX. 
CITATIONS SHOWING ADOPTION OF MAJORITY 
RULE OF T'\VENTY-FOUR STATES. 
ALABAMA. 
Birmingham Southern R. Co. v. Lintner, 141 Ala. 420, 38 So. 
363, 109 Am. St. Rep. 40, 3 Ann. Cas. 461 (1904). · 
ARIZONA .. 
Jenkins~- S!celton, 21 Ariz. 663~ 1.92 Pac. 249 (1920). 
GEORGIA. 
Georgia Railway <t Power Co. v. Endsley, 167 Ga. 439,-145" 
S. E. 851, 62 A. L. R. 256 (.1928). 
KANSAS. 
Fiscus v. Kansas City Pul1lic Service Co., 1.53 Kan. 493, 112 
P. (2d) 83 (1941). 
KENTUCKY. 
Cassidy v. Berkovitz~ 169 Ky. 785, 185 S. '\V. 129 (1~16). 
MAINE. 
Pillsbury v. Ke.s,,;len Shoe Co., 136 Me. 235, 7 A.· (2d) 898 
(1939). · 
MASSACHUSETTS. . . 
Doran v. Cohen, 147 Mass. 342, 17 N. E: 647 (1888). 
Dearden v. Hey, 304 Mass. ~59, 24 N. E. (2d) 644~ 127 A. 
L. R. 1077 (1939). 
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MINNESOTA. 
King v. Chicago, Milwaukee <I; St. Paul Railway Co., 80 
Minn, 83, 82 N. ,v. 113, 50 L. R. A. 161, 81 Am. St. Rep. 
(1900). 
'MISSISSIPPI. 
Kimball v. Louisville,~ Nashville R. Co., 94 Miss. 396, 48 So. 
230 (1909). 
MICHIGAN. 
Tuttle v. Everhot Heater Co., 264 Mich. 60, 249 N. "\V. 467 
(1933). 
MISSOURI. 
Coy v. St. Louis & 8. F. R. Co., 186 :Mo. App. 408, 172 S. W. 
446 (1915). 
NORTH CAROLINA. 
Underwood v. Dooley, 197 N: C. lOQ, 147 S. E. 686, 64 A. 
L. R. 656 (1929). 
NORTH DAKOTA. 
Anderson v. Jacobson, 42 N. D. 87, 172 N. i.v. 64 (1919). 
OKLAHOMA. 
City of Altus v. Fletc1ier, 142_ P. (2d) 614, 193 Okla. 220 
(1943). 
PENNSYLVANIA. 
Fields v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 273 Pa. 282, 117 
Atl. 59 (1922). · 
SOUTH CAROLINA. 
Holcombe v. Garlmid and Denwiddie, 162 S. C. 379, 160 
S. E. 881 (1931) ... 
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SOUTH DAKOTA. 
Boos v. Clattde, .... S. D ..... , 9 N. Vv. (2d) 262 (1943). 
' 
' ' 
TENNESSEE. 
Mobile it Ohio R. Co. v. Mattlieuis, 115 Tenn. 172, 91 S. W. 
194 (1906). 
UTAH. 
Sniitlt v. Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, 279 Pac. 893 (1929). 
VERMONT. 
Moullroup v. Gorham., 113 Vt. 317, 34 A. (2d) 96 (1943). 
WASHINGTON. 
Sprague v. Adam .. ~, 139 Wash. 510,247 Pac. 960; 47 A. L. R; 
529 (1926). 
WISCONSIN. 
Bootl~ a. Frankenstein, 209 Wis. 362, 245 N. W. 191 (1932). 
,VEST VIRGINIA. 
Larzo v. Swift d: Co., .... W. Va ..... , 40 S. E. (2d) 811 
(1946). . 
WYOMING. 
Hazard Powder Co. v. Volger, 3 Wyo. 189, 18 Pac. 637 .. 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Circuit Court o~ Alleghany County at 
the Courthouse tl1ereof on the 23rd day of February, 1948. 
Jacob B. Hinkle, Plaintiff 
v. 
. . 
Bishop Edward Carter and Thomas William Smith, Jr., De-
fendants 
NOTICE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
To Bishop Edward Carter and Thomas William Smith, Jr.:· 
You, and each of you, are hereby notified that on the 15th 
day of April, 1947, that being the first day of April Term, 
1947, of the Circuit Court for Alleghany County, Virginia, the 
undersigned will move the Circuit Court for Alleghany 
County, Virginia, for a judgment against you, and each of 
you, for the sum of Ten Thousand ($10.:.000.00) Dollars, which 
is justly due and owing by you, and each of you, to the under-
signed as damages for this, to-wit: 
That heretofore on, to-wit, the 20th day of December, 1946, 
_the undersigned was driving or operating his Buick Sedan 
automobile in Alleghany County, Virginia, on U. S. Route -60 
(known as Old U.S. Route 60).npproximately 7% miles west 
of the Town of Covington, Virginia, and proceeding in an 
eastward direction toward the Town of Covington, Virginia, 
when the Chevrolet Sedan automobile owned by yon, Thomas 
William Smith, Jr., and then and there being operated by 
you, Bishop Edward Carter, tbe agent, servant, and 
page 2 ~ emploJJc of Thomas William Smith, .Tr., and then 
and there being driven or operated in a careless 
and negligent manner, and on the wrong or left-hand side of 
the said highway, ran against, upon1 and into tlie said Buick 
Sedan owned and operated by tlie undersigned, causing the 
damages and injuries hereinafter specified. · 
That at the time of said collision the Buick automobile 
owned and operated by the undersi~ned was completely on 
its right hand or proper side of tl1e highway and the under-
si~ned, having observed the carcl<1ss and neglip:ent manner in 
which the Chevrolet automobile was tlrnn and there being op-
erated by you, Bishop Edward Carter, ancl by yon, Thomas • 
• 
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,vmiam Smith, Jr., acting by and through your said agent, 
servant, and employee, Bishop Edward Carter, had moved 
farther to his own right-hand side of the highway until both 
the front and rear wheels on the rigllt-hancl side of the said 
.Buick automobile were completely off the hard surfaced por-
tion of the highway and on tho shoulder, and the said Buick 
had been brought practically to a complete stop at the time 
your ·said automobile, being then and there carelessly, negli-
gently, and recklessly opernted as aforesaid, rnn into and col-
lided with the sai<l Buick automobile owned and operated by 
the undersigned. ~hat at the time and place above specified 
it became and was the duty of you, Bishop Edward Carter, 
und you, Thomas "Tilliam Smith, Jr., acting hy and through 
your agent, servant and employee, the said Bishop Ed,vard 
Carter, to operate your said motor vehicle in a 
page 3 ~ careful aud prudent manner, having due regard for 
the safety, lfres, and property of the undersigned, 
and all other persons using said highway, which said duty 
you, and each of you, owed. specifically to the undersigned as 
well as to all other persons using said highway, but despite 
your said duty to tire undersigned and totally disregarding 
the same, you,.Bishop Edward Carter, and you, Thomas \Vil- . 
Ham Smith, Jr., acting by nncl through your said agent, serv-
ant, and employee, Bishop Edward Carter, operated your 
said automobile in a careless, negligent, and reckless manner 
at a speed greater than was reasonably safe and proper in 
view of the condition of the highway, weather, traffic, and all 
other conditions then and prevailing, without keeping said 
vehicle under proper control, without keeping a proper look-
out for other vehicles or persons then and th,~re being- law-
fully upon said l1ighway, and operating said automobile on 
the left-hand side of the highway in contravention of the 
laws of the State of Virginia; and that your carelessness, 
negligence, and recklessnesR in operating your said automo-
bile in the manner herehmhov<' specified and in total disre-
gard to your said duty to the undersigned constitutes th(' sole 
proximate cause of the colli~ion aforc>said between your said 
automobile and the nntomobile owned and operated by the 
undersigned and causing the damages and injuries herein-
after set forth. 
That as the direct result of said coJlision the un-
page 4 } dersig11ecl suffered gTievous, painful. clisa bling, and 
permanent injurim: to hiR face, head, bodv: and 
limbs, causing the nndersignNl great pain, fo;Uffering-, and 
mental anguish, and totally disablinp; the undersig.11ed from 
performing any work or pursuing- any {.?'ainful OC<'nr,ation for 
a period of more than two months, and which still prevents 
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the undersigned from engab,ing in his usual occupation of 
operating an automobile for hire so that the undersigned has 
been forced to employ another man as a driver for llis taxi 
automobile and pay said driver a salary which the under-
signed might otherwise have been earnin~ personally. In ad-
dition thereto the undersigned has sustamed divers expenses 
for hospitalization, medical fees, and drug bills in and about 
the treating, healing, and improving of his physical condition 
which was damaged as afo1·esaid, and in au attempt to alleviate 
the great pain, suffering·, and mental anguish caused by said 
injuries, such expenses having amounted to a large sum, to-
wit, the sum of Seventy-eight ($78.00) Dollars. The said in-
juries consist of two lacerations on the forehead, one of which 
required stitches to close and which has left a permanently 
disfiguring scar on the undersigned's forehead; a brain con-
cussion from which the undersigned still suffers headaches; 
his chest crushed in so that the undersigned was not able to 
lie down even to sleep for 37 days and which even now pre-
vents the undersigned from pursuing- his usual duties and 
. causes great pain and suffering; four teeth knocked 
page 5 ~ loose, multiple laceratfons on both knees and bruises 
and contusions on the light ankle and. leg, a lacera-
tion, contusion, and bruises on the left elbow as well as divers 
other lacerations, bruises, contusions, and injuries of and to 
the body and limbs of the undersigned, by virtue of all of 
which the undersigned has been damaJred to the exfont of the 
sum of Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars, for which said 
sum the undersigned will move the Court for a judgment 
against you; ancl each of yon, at the time and place above 
specified. 
Respectfully,, 
,T. C. GOODWIN, p. q. 
·w1LLIAM GOODE, p. q. 
JACOB B. HINKLE, 
By Counsel 
The Returns on the fore~oing Notice of Motion are in the 
words and figures following, to-wit: 
Executed in the City of Richmond, Vil'ginia this,15 day of 
March, 1947, by dclivP.ring a true copy of the within Notice 
in writing to Thomas "Tilliam Smith, Jr., in person. 
WALTER B. GENTRY 
SPrgeant CitY of Richmond, Va. 
By B. Y. WILLIAMS 
Deputy Sergeant 
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Executed witl1in the City of Richmond, Virginia, March 17, 
.. ,47, by delivering in duplicate a copy of the within Notice to 
C. F. Joyner, .Jr., Director of the Division of Motor 
page 6 ~ Vehicles, Commonwealth of Virginia for Bishop 
Edward Carter, 418 Patterson Street., Lexington, 
Kentucky. The said C. F. Joyner, Jr. being the true and law-
ful attorney for said Bishop Edward Carter Defendant, as 
provided under Statutes and Acts, etc. Fee of $3.00 paid 
:Motor Vehicle Deparbncnt at time of service of this Notice. 
WALTER B. GENTRY, 
City Sergeant 
By B. Y. WILLIAMS 
Deputy City Sergeant 
Clerk's Endorsement on the aforesaid Notice of Motion, 
is in the words nncl figures following, to-wit: 
Returned to and filed in Alleghany Circuit Court Clerk's 
Office, Marcl1 19th, 1947. 
F. E. DILLARD, Clerk. 
The affidavit of the receipt of the institution of the afore-
said Notice of Motion by the Commissioner of Division of 
:Motor Vehicles., is in the words and figures following, to-wit: 
AFFIDAVIT. 
I, Agnes L. Mullins, being cognizant of the facts as re-
<1uired by statute and being dci;;ignatod for the purpose by C. 
F. Joyner, .Jr., Commissioner of the Division of Motor Ve-
l1icles of the Commonwea~th of Virginia, do certify that on 
tl1e 17th day of )larch, 1947, notice of motion in the ca~e of 
Jacob B. Hinkle, Plaintiff v. Bishop Edward Carter and 
· Thomas ,vmiam Smith, .Tr., defenrlants pendin~ in 
· page 7 ~ the Circuit Court of Alleglmny County, Virginia, 
was left in the office of the Commissione1· of the Di-
vision of Motor Vehicles of the Commonwealth of Virginia, 
in the City or Ricl1moncl, Virginia, together with a fee of 
$ROO by the Sergeant of the City of Richmond, Virginia, in 
nccoraance with section 2:l of Chapter 342, Acts of the Gen-
eral Assembly of Virginia of 1932, and Acts amendatory 
thereof. 
I further certify that on the 18th dav of l\farcll. l!l4-7, a · 
copy of said notice of motion and a notice of the fact that -' 
such notice of motion was left in said office in the City of 
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Richmond, Virginia, on the 17th day of March, 1947, were for-
warded by the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Ve-
hicles of the Commonwealth of Virginia, by registered mtiil, 
to Bishop Edward Carter, at 418 Patterson Street, Lexington, 
Kentucky, registered delivery receipt for same being re-
quested. 
Given under my hand this the 18th day of March, 1947. 
AGNES L. MULLINS 
State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit : 
I, Margaret H. Seay, a Notary Public in and for the City 
of Richmond, State of Virginia, do hereby certify that Abrries 
L. Mullins, whose name is signed to the foregoing affidavit 
bearing date on the 18th day of March, 1947, personally ap-
peared before me in my City and State and made oath that 
the matters therein contained are true. 
Given under my liand this the 18th day of March, 1947. 
Notarial Seal MARGARET H. SEAY, 
Notary Public. 
l\ly commission expires March 15, 1948. 
page 8 } The Notice referred to in the foregoing affidavit, 
is in the words and figures following, to-wit: 
NOTICE. 
To: Bishop Edwnr<l Cal'tcr, 418 Patterson Street, Lexington, 
Kentucky. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 17th clay of l\farcl1, 
1947, the attached Notice of Motion in the case of Jacob B. 
Hinkle, plaintiff, r. Bishop Ed·ward Carter aud Thomas ,vn-
Iiam Smith, ,Jr., clefendnnt!-1, pending in the Circuit Court of 
Alleghany County,, Virginia, was left in my office in the City 
of Richmond, Virginia, in accordance with the provisions ol' 
section :23 of Chapter 342, Acts of 1932, General Assembly of 
Virginia, and Acts amcmclatory thereof, ancl that same i~ hC'-
ing forwarded to you hy rt'gisterecl mail with registered de-
livery' receipt requested. 
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Given under my hand in the City of Richmond, Virginia,. 
this the 18th day of March, 1947. . 
C. F. JOYNER, JR. 
Commissioner of the Division of 1Iotor Ve-
hicles of the Commonwealth of Virginia. 
By AGNES L. MULLL~S 
State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit: · 
I, Margaret H. Seay, a Notary Public in and for the City 
of Richmond, State of Virginia, do certify that Agnes L. Mul- . 
lins, whose name is signed to the foregoing writing, has per-
sonally appeared before me in my city aforesaid and 
page 9 ~ made oath that the matters therein contained are 
true. 
Given under my hand this the 18th day of March, 1947. 
Notarial Seal MARGARET H. SEAY, 
Notary Public. 
)Iy com.mission expires March 15, 1948. 
At a Circuit Court continued and held in the Countv of 
Alleghany at the Courthouse thereof, on the 15th day of 
April, 1947. 
Jacob B. Hinkle, Plaintiff 
v. 
ORDER. 
Bishop Edward Carter and Thomas '\Vi1linms Smith, .Jr., De-
fendants 
ORDER 
This day came the defendants, Thomas ·Williams Smith, Jr., 
nnd Bishop Edward Carter, by counsel, and after :first ob-
taining leave of Court, filed their separate pleas of not guilty 
nnd special pleas. 
The Pleas of Not Guilty referred to in the foregoing order, 
are in the words and figures f olJowing, to-wit: 
.Jacob B. Hinkle, Plaintiff 
v. 
Bishop Edward Carter and Thomas Williams Smith, .Jr., De-
fendants 
28 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
PLEA OF NOT GUILTY OF THOMAS WILLIA.!\£ 
SMITH, .TR. 
The defendant, Thomas William Smith, Jr., by his attor-
neys, comes and says that he is not guilty of the acts of neg-
ligence charged 'by the plaintiff in his notice of motion for 
judgment. And of this he puts himself upon the country. 
page 10 ~ THOMAS WILLIAM SMITH, JR., 
By Counset 
WOODS, ROGERS, MUSE & WALKER, p. d. 
and 
Jacob B. Hinkle, Plaintiff, 
'V, 
Bishop Edward Carter and Thomas William Smith, Jr., De-
fendants. 
PLEA OF NOT GUILTY OF BISHOP EDWARD CARTER 
The defendant, Bishop Edward Carter, by his attorneys, 
comes and says that he is not guilty of the acts of negligence 
charged by the plaintiff in his notice of motion for judg-
ment.. And of this he puts himself upon the country. 
BISHOP EDWARD CARTER, 
By Counsel. 
WOODS, ROGERS, :MUSE & WALKER, p. d. 
The special pleas ref erred to in the foregoing order are 
in the words and figures following, to-wit: 
Jacob B. Hinkle, Plaintiff, 
1}. 
Bishop Edward Carter and Thomas ,vnliam Smith, Jr., De-
fendants. · 
Vs';ECIAL PLEA OF THOMA~ ·w1LLIA1'1 Sl\fITH, JR. 
Now comes the undersigned defendant, Thomas William 
Smith, Jr., and says: · 
1. Heretofore on the 16th day of ,January, 1947, Roberta 
T. Echols, Clerk of the Trial Justice Court of Alleghany 
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County, issued a warrant summoning the under-
page 11} signed defendant to appear before R. E. Dyche, 
Trial Justice of said County, to answer to the , 
complaint of the plaintiff herein upon a claim of money in 
the sum of One Thousand ($1,000) Dollars, Seven Hundred 
and Fifty ($750.00) Dollars damages to Jiis automobile and 
Two Hundred and Fifty ($250) Dollars damages for reason 
of not having the use of the automobile in his business. 
2. This warrant was directed to the Sergeant of tbe City 
of Richmond, was duly .served upon the undersig11ed defend-
ant and returned to tl1e Clerk of the Trial Justice Court of 
Alleghany County. 
3. On the 30th day of January, 1947, judgment was ren-
dered by the Trial Justice in favor of the plaintiff Jacob B. 
Hinkle in the amount sued for with interest and Five Dollars 
and Seventy-five Cents ($5.75) costs. 
4. On the 10tl1 day of February, 1947, execution was had 
and on the 12th day of February, 1947, the judgment was 
paid and the plaintiff made the following endorsement on 
the judgment docket of the said Trial Justice's Court: '' Paid 
in full for judgment-February 12, 1947,'' signed "Jacob B. 
Hinkle''. 
5. The undersigned avers and stands ready to prove: 
( a) that plaintiff's cause of action in tl1e Trial .Justice's 
Court was founded on the same automobile accident Aet out in 
liis Notice of Motion, and 
(b) that tl1e alleged tortious acts clmrged to the defend-
ant in the Notice of Motion are identical with those upon 
which the plaintiff l1as hcrctof ore had judgment 
page 12 } and satisfaction from the undersigned defendant. 
, 6. The undersigned defendant further says: 
(a) that but one cause of action accrued to plaintiff as a 
result of the alleged tortious acts; and that he is not per-
mitted in law to maintain separate causes of action to re-
cover for his property. damage and alleged ·personal injuries, 
and 
, (b) that plaintiff's 1·ight, if any, to recover damages for 
his alleged personal injuries was merged in the judgment 
heretofore rendered and satisfied. / 
And this the said defendant is ready to verify. 
Wherefore, as all matters in controversy between the plain-
tiff and the undersigned defendant have been heretofore ad-
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judicated, the undersigned should be dismissed with his costs 
in this behalf expended. 
Respectfully, 
THOMAS WILLIAM SMITH, JR.; 
By Counsel . 
. WOODS, ROGERS, MUSE & WALKER, p. cl 
and 
Jacob·B. Hinkle, Plaintiff, 
fl, . . • 
Bishop Edward Carter and Thomas William Smith, Jr., De-
fendants. 
y' SPECIAL PLEA OF BISHOP EDWARD CARTER. 
Now comes the undersigned defendant, Bishop Edward 
Carter, and says: 
1. At the time of the commission of the alleged 
page 13 } acts of ncglig·ence charged by plaintiff in his No-
tice of l\f otion, the undersigned defendant was the 
agent, servant, and employee of Thomas William Smith, Jr. 
2. The undersigned defendant's liability, if any, to the 
plaintiff is joint and several with the said Thomas William 
Smith, Jr. · . 
3. Heretofore on the l.6tl1 day of January, 1947, Roberta 
T. Echols, Clerk of the Trial Justice Court of Alleghany 
County, issued a warrant summoning the said Thomas Wil-
liam Smith, .Jr., to appear before R. E. Dyche, Trial Justice 
of said county, to answer to the complaint of the plaintiff 
herein upon u claim of money in the sum of One Tho:usand · 
($1,000) Dollars, -Seven Hundred and Fifty ($750) Dollars 
damages· to l1is automobile and Two Hundred and- Fifty 
($250) Dollars damages for reason of not having tlie use of 
the automobile in bis business. · 
4. This warrant was directed to the Sergeant of the City 
of Richmond, '.was duly served upon the said Thomas William 
Smith, Jr., and retumcd to the Clerk of t.he Trial Justice 
Court of Alleghany County. 
5. On the 30th day of Jm!uai-y, 1947, judgment was ren-
dered bv the Trial .Justice in favor of the plaintiff Jacob B. 
Hinkle and against the said Thomas ,Villiam Smith, Jr., in 
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the amount sued for with interest and Five Dollars and Sev-
enty-five Cents ( $,5. 75) eosts. 
6. On the 10th day of February, 1947, execution 
page 14} was had and on tho 12th day of February, 1947, 
the judgment was paid and the plaintiff made the 
following endorsement on the judgment docket of the said 
.. Trial Justice's Court: "Paid in full for judgment-Febru-
ary 12, 1947," signed '~Jacob B. Hinkle". 
7. The undersigned avers and stands ready to prove: 
(a) that plaintiff's cause of action in the Trial Justice's 
Court was founded on the same auotmobile accident set out in 
his Notice of Motion ; and 
(b) that the alleged tortious acts charged to the under-
signed defendant in the Notice of Motion are identical with 
those imputed to the said Thomas William Smith, Jr., as the 
undersigned's master and principal in the action in the Trial 
.T ustice Court and upon which the plaintiff has heretofore had 
judgment and satisfaction from the said Thomas ·wmiam 
Smith, Jr. 
8. The undersigned defendant further says: 
(a) that but one cause of action accrued to plaintiff as a 
result of the alleged tortious acts; and that he is not per-
initted in law to maintain separate causes of action to re-
cover for his property damage and alleged personal injuries; 
and 
(b) that·plaintiff's right, if any, to recover damages for 
liis alleged personal injuries was merged in the judgment 
l1eretof ore rendered and satisfied; and 
( c) that plaintiff is entitled to but one satisfaction for the 
same cause ·of action, and under the. provisions. of 
Jlage 15} Section 6264 of the Virginia Code, the payment 
• of the judgment obtained against the said Thomas 
William Smith, ,Jr., acted as a discharge of any cause of ac-
tion which the plaintiff might have against the undersigned 
defendant. 
And this the said defendant is ready to ·verify. 
Wherefore, as plaintiff bas elected to proceed against the 
said Thomas ·wmiam Smitl1, ,Tr., and has had judgment and 
satisfaction, l1e is estopped' from maintaining his present 
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cause of action against the undersigned; and the undersigned 
defendant should be dismissed with his costs in this behalf 
expended.· 
Respectfully, 
BISHOP EDW .ARD CARTER. 
By Counsel. 
WOODS, ROGERS, MUSE & WALKER, p. d. 
At a Circuit Court continued and held in the County of Al-
leghany at the Courthouse thereof on the 6th day of May, 
1947. 
ORDER. 
Jacob B. Hinkle, Plaintiff, 
11, 
Bishop Edward Carter and Thomas William Smith, Jr., De-
fendants. 
ORDER. · 
This day came the plaintiff, by counsel, and after first ob-
taining leave of court, filed his demurrers to the sepamte 
special pleas which were filed by the defendants ori the 15th 
day of April, 1947. · 
page 16 ~ The Demurrers referred to in the foregoing or-
der arc in the words. and figures following, to-wit: 
·,Jacob B. Hinkle, Plaintiff, 
~ . 
Bishop Edward Carter and Thomas ,vmiam Smith, Jr., De-
fendants. · 
• DEMURRER TO SPECIAL PLEA OF THOMAS "\VIL-
LIAM SMJTH, ,TR. .-- _... 
The said plaintiff says that the special plea filed by the de-
fendant, T4omns ,vmiam Smith, ,Jr., is uot sufficient in law 
for the following reasons: 
1. That the judgment heretofore recovered in the Trial 
Justice Court fo1· Alleghany Connty, Virginia, against 
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Thomas William Smith, Jr., in favor of the plaintiff was a 
judgment for property damage only suffered by the plain-
tiff by reason of the damage to his automobi.le and loss to 
l1is business by virtue of his being deprived of the use of said 
automobile. The said action required different proof and was 
a different type of. action from the one. sued upon in the 
notice of motion filed in the Circuit Court for Alleghany 
County, Virginia; being action which could be maintained by 
the personal representative of the plaintiff after his death, 
whereas the instant case is a personal action for damages for 
personal injuries which would not survive the said plaintiff. 
2. That the judgment mentioned in the said special plea 
and sought to be set up as a bar to this action is in fact a 
void judgment, the same having been erroneously 
page 17} awarded in a suit against the defendant, Thomas 
William Smit11, .Jr., who was then a non..:resident 
of the State of Virginia witl1out service of process the said 
Thomas William Smith, Jr., eitl1er personally or by any sub-
stituted service provided by law: 
• T. C. GOODWIN, p. q. 
,vrLLIAM GOODE, p. q. 
', .Tacob B. Hinkle, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Respectfully, 
.JACOB B. HINKLE, 
By Counsel . 
Bishop Ed,vards Carter and Thomas ,villiam Smith, Jr., 
fendants. 
DEMURRER TO SPECIAL PLEA OF BISHOP EDWARD 
CARTER.. , 
---------------
The said plaintiff says that tlie special plea filed by the 
defendant, Bishop Edward Carter, is not sufficient in law for 
the following 1•easons: 
1. That the said defendant's liability to the plaintiff is 
not only joint with that of the other defendant, Thomas Wil-
liam Smith, .Jr., but is also a several liability growing out of 
the tortious act or acts, or omission or omissions of· the said 
defendant and that no action or suit has heretofore been in-
stituted against the said def eudant arising out of the said 
tortious acts or omissions. 
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2. That the judgment heretofore recovered in the Trial 
Justice Court for Alleghany County, Virginia, against 
Thomas William Smith, Jr., in favor of the plain-
page 18 ~ tiff was a judgment for property damage onlv suf-
fered by the plaintiff by reason of the damage to 
his automobile and loss to ltls business by virtue of bis being 
deprived of the use of said automobile. The said action re-
quired different proof and was a different type of action from 
the one sued upon in the notice of motion filed in the Circuit 
Court for· Alleghany County, Virginia, being action which 
could b~ m~intained by the personal representative of the 
plaintiff after his death, whereas the instant ·case is a per-
sonal action 'for damages for personal injuries which would 
not survive the said plaintiff. 
3. That tl1e judgment mentioned in the said special plea 
and sought to be set up as a bar to this action is in fact a 
void judgment, the same having · been erroneously awarded 
in a suit against the defendant, Thomas William Smith, Jr., 
who was then a non-resident of the State of Virginia with-
out service of process the said Thomas William Smith, Jr., 
either personally or by any substituted service provided by 
law. · 
,J. C. GOOD"WIN, p. q. 
WILLIAM GOODE, p. q. 
Respectfully, 
JACOB B. H!NKLE, 
By Counsel. 
At a Circuit Court continued and held in tl10 County of 
Allegha·uy at the Courthouse thereof on the 16th of July, 
1947. 
page 19 ~ Jacob B. Hinkle, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Bisliop Edward Carter and Thomas William 
Smith, ,Jr., Defonclants. 
ORDER. 
This day came the defendants, Bishop Edward Carter and 
Thomas \Villiam Smith, Jr., and after first obtaining leave 
of court, filed their separate motions to strike portions of 
pluintiff 's demurrer to their special plea. 
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Th~ Motions referred to in the foregoing order are in the 
. words and :figures following, to-wit: 
Jacob B. Hinkle, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Bishop Edwards Carter and Thomas ·william Smith, Jr., 
Defendants. 
MOTION. 
Now comes the defendant, Thomas William Smith, Jr., 
and moves the t'ourt that there be stricken from plaintiff's 
demurrer to defendant's special plea, Item No. 2 thereof. 
And for grounds for said motion, said def end ant would 
~~i . 
1. This item contains an allegation of a new fact, is a de-
nial of a fact admitted by plaintiff's demurrer and is not 
pleaded in tl1e alternative. · 
2. The judgment attacked as void by plaintiff was pro-
cured by him and be received the benefits thereof. He is, in 
law, estopped from denying its validity. • 
page 20 ~ 3. Even if the service of process in the former 
action was defective, this defect was cured by a 
general appearance of the defendant before the said judg-
ment became final, defendant Smith having served notice on 
the plaintiff within the ten days allowed for appeal tbat he 
would move the court to set aside the judgment rendered by 
default. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THOMAS WILtIAM SMITH, JR., 
By Counsel. 
WOODS, ROGERS, l\IUSE & ,VALICER, p. d. 
and 
Jacob R Hinkle, Piaintiff, 
v. 
Bishop Edward Carter and Thomas William Smith, Jr., De-
fendants .. 
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MOTION. 
Now comes defendant Bishop Edward Carter and moves 
the court that there be stricken from plaintiff's demurrer to 
defendants' special plea, Item No. 3 thereof. . 
And for grounds for said motion, said defendant would 
show: 
1. This item contains an allegation or a new fact, is a de-
nial of a fact admitted by plaintiff's demurrer and is not· 
pleaded. in the alternative. · 
2. The Judgment attacked as void by plaintiff was pro-
cured by. him and he received the benefits tliereof. He is, in 
law, estopped from denying its. validity. · 
3. Even if the service of process in the former 
page 21 } action was defective, this defect was cured by a 
general appearance of the defendant before the 
said judgment became final, defendant Smith having ser~ed 
notice on the plaintiff within the ten days allowed for ap-
peal that lie would move the court to set aside the· judgment 
rendered by default. 
• Respect'fully submitted, 
BISHOP EDWARD CARTER, 
By Counsel. 
WOODS, ROGERS, liUSE & WALKER, p. d. 
At a Circuit Court continued and held in the County of 
Alleghany at the Courthouse thereof on the 22nd day of J anu-
ary, 1948. 
Jacob B. Hinkle, Plaintiff, 
v. . 
Bisl1op Edward Carter and Thomas William Smith, Jr., De-
fendants. 
ORDER. 
This cause came ou to be heard upon the special pleas of 
· euch of the defendants, in which it was alleged that the plain-
tiff had heretofore brought a suit against the defendant, 
T. ,v. Smith, Jr., for property damage to the plaintiff's au-
tomobile.sustained in the collision complained of in the Notice 
of l\fotion for Judgment, and that the said plaintiff lmving 
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recovered a judgment and satisfaction of said judgment for 
damages growing out of said collision, he was thereby 
estopped from maintaining this action; upon the separate de-
murrers of the plaintiff to each of said pleas, which were 
filed separately by the def eridants; and was p.rgued by coun-
sel. 
page 22 } And the Court not being advised of its decision 
as to the said special pleas and the demurrers 
thereto took the same under advisement, and having consid-
ered the same and now being of the opinion that the said de-
murrers should be sustained upon the first ground thereof, 
although the second ground of said demurrers is invalid and 
should be stricken, for the reason set forth in the written 
opinion of the Court filed herein and made a part of the rec-
ord in this cause, the Court doth accordingly Adjudge and 
Order that the. said demurrers to the said special pleas be, 
and the same are hereby sustained upon the first ground 
thereof and tl1e said special pleas are dismissed, to which 
said action in sustaining the plaintiff's demurrers and dis-
missing the said special pleas the defendants, by counsel, ex-. 
cepted. 
The Opinion l'eferred to iri the foregoing Order, is in the 
words and fig·ures following, to-wit: 
OPI1'.'TJON. 
Jacob B. Hinkle, Plaintiff, 
'l), 
Bishop Edward Carter and Thomas William Smith, Jr., De-
fendants. 
OPIN10N. 
The plaintiff instituted this action b~· notice of motion for 
judgment against the defendants as the result of an auto-
mobile accident in which l1e suffered personal injuries. In 
the same accident he also suffered damage to his automohile 
and loss of his automobile which was used by him as a taxi. 
Plaintiff in a separate action before the trial jus-
page 23 ~ · tice of Alle~hany County got a warrant for the 
damage to the automobile and loss of use against 
Smith as the sole clef endant. Service was Imel on Smith, who 
was the owner of the other automobile, by leaving a copy of 
the warrant at his usual place of abode in the City of Rich-
mo11d, Virginia. On Janum~y 30, 1947, judgment by default 
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was entered against him by 'the trial justice in the amount 
of $1,000.00. On February 3, 1947, Smith, through his attor-
ney served notice on the plaintiff that on February 8, 1947,. 
he would move the trial justice to rehear and set aside the 
judgment by def a ult. Subsequently this motion was with-
drawn without a hearing and the judgment by default be-
came final. Execution was issued on February 10, 1947, and 
~~:Judgment was paid and marked satisfied on February 12, 
,/The plaintiff afterwards instituted this action for personal 
injuries·against both the defendants which was returnable to 
April 15, 1947. On this day both defendants filed special 
pleas ·setting up the former satisfied judgment and relying 
on the fact the plaintiff had attempted to split an indivisible 
cause of action. 
To these special pleas the plaintiff demurred on the 
grounds that they were (1) insufficient at law and (2) that 
the judgment set up in bar was a void judgment in that the 
plaintiff had not secured personal service or substituted serv-
ice authorized by statute against. the defendant Smith on the 
warrant before the trial justice for the recovery damage. 
The defendants moved to strike out the second 
page 24 ~ ground of the demurrer on the grounds; that this 
item contains the allegation of a new fact, is a 
denial of a fact admitted by the demurrer and is not pleaded 
in the alternative; that the judgment attacked as void was 
procured by the plaintiff and he rec<'ived the benefits thereof; 
he is therefore cstopped to deny its validity; even if the serv-
ice of process in the former action was defective, this defect. 
was cured by the general appearance of the defendant before 
the judgment became final. 
It is well settled, basecl upo_n the general principles of law, 
that the plaintiff cmmot r(.lceive the benefits of the action 
and at the same time deny its validity, and equally well set-
tled that tl1e general appearanC'e of the defen < nt before 
final judgment cures any clefec>t in the service o ro<'ess or the 
retum of the offi<'er. Citation of authori · s to this effect 
is not necessary. In Caskie v. Durham, 152 V n. 345, it is now 
settled that the return of the offi<'er is conclusive in Virginia. 
The motions to strike the second ground of tl1e demurrer arc 
therefore sustained. 
The main question in this pro<'eecling· is whether the plain-
tiff has an indivisible NlUS<' of action on which l1e can mnin-
t.nin onlv one action or a divisible one on whi<'h he mav main-
fain separate actions n~ainst the defef!dant. The propm~ition 
may he stated more dearly as a qneshon of whether a single 
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negligent act, causing damage to the person and 
page 25 ~ property of the same individual, gives rise to two 
cause of action or only one: To this simple propo-
sition the authorities are in c~mflict. The question is one 'of 
first impression in Virginia. 
The rule is that a single or entire ea use o~f· on cannot 
be divided into several claims and separate ctions main-
tained thereon. Jones v. Morris Plan lJank, 1 8 Va. 284, 191 
S. E. 608. If the alJeged cause of action here involved is a 
single cause of action which eannot be divided into several 
claims then Jones v. llf orris Plan Bank, is controlling. 
. The rule followed in a majority of t11e states is that a single 
wrongful or ~egligent net or omission causing an injury to 
both the person ,and the property of the same individual, con-
stitutes but one cause of action with separate items of dam-
age; hence the cause of action cannot be split, and a reeovery 
of a judgment for either item of damage may be pleaded in 
har of an action to recover for the other itnm of damn~e. I 
Am. Jnr., Actions., Section 114, Pag·e 494.. The reason as-
signed is that the defendant's negligent act i~ sing·le, the cause 
of action must be single, and that the different injuries st\f-
f'ered arc merely items of damage proceeding from the same 
wrong. There are however, exceptions to this rule whiel1 are 
not necessary to be considered in this proceeding. 
, The minority rule, nlso known as the English rule, is that 
two causes of action result from the negligent act which in-
flicts injury to a person ancl his property at the 
page 26 ~ same time: hence a reeovery under one cause of , 
actj.on cannot be pleaded in bar of a recovery on 
the other cause of action. · 
Both views are supported by respectable autl10ritie€l. See 
annotations in 47 A. L. R. 536, 64 A. L. R. 663, 127 A. L. R. 
1081, 140 A. L. R. 1241 ancl 166 A. L. R. 870. 
The English rul<', estnblis1wcl in the cnse of Brnnsden v. 
llumvhrev (1884), L. R. 14 Q. B. Div. 141, is tlmt damages to 
· the person and to property, though occasioned by the same 
wrongful act, give i'ise to different causes of action. In that 
case the plaintiff broug-ht an action in a county court for clam- . 
ages to his cab, occasioned by the nep;ligence of the -def end-
ant's servant, and lmving recovered the amount claimed, af-
t.envarcls brougl1t an aetion in the high court of justice ag-ainst 
the defendant, claiming damage for personal injurv sustained 
hy him through the same nettligence. It was held that tl1e 
action could be maintained. The court. thromd1 Bowen. L .• T. 
i-aicl: "Two separate kinds of injur~; were in fact inflicted, 
ancl two wron~s clone. The mere ne!l'li.g-ent driving in ihrnlf, 
if accompanied by no injury to the plaintiff, was not action· 
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able at all, for it was not a wrongful act at all till a wrong 
arose out of the damage which it caused. One wrong was done 
as soon as the plaintifPs enjoyment of bis property was sub-
stantially interfered with. A further wrong arose as soon 
as the driver also caused injury to the plaintiff's person. 
Both causes of action, in one sense, J!lay be said to be f oundecl 
· upon one act of the defendant's servant, but they are not, on 
that' account, identical causes of action." 
page ·27 ~ The plaintiff contends that the English decision 
· · just referr to is declaratory of the common law 
in England which i inding upon this court, and cites as his 
authoritv, Secti01 2 of the Code of Virginia. This section 
of the Code provides as follows: '' The common law of Eng-
land, so far as it is hot repugnant to the principles of the 
Bill of Rights and the Constitution of this State, shall con-
tinue in force within the same, and be the rule ot' decision~ 
except in those respects wherein it is or shall be altered by 
the General Asseml?.J:y." 
The history ot' )12~s provision may be found in Foster v. 
Commonwealth, 96 Va. 306, 31 S. E. 503, wherein it is ascer-
tained tl1at it wns first adopted by the Convention of J\fay, 
1776, which declared our separation from England and framed 
the first Constitution of t11e State. It has sub!Sequently been 
adopted by the legislature in each code and is in force ancl 
effect at this time. 
Under the common law practice, in actions ex dclicfo: sev-
eral different causes, each of whieh were enforceable by the 
:mme form of nction could be joined. In 1 Am. Jur., Actions, 
Section 73, Pnge 4G2, this is stntecl: ""\iVhere a tort against 
a person results in injury to both the person and the property 
of the plaintiff, he may, in a single action, recover for all such 
damages. $ ~ 0 Uudel' the common law, however, counts upon 
distinct causes of action e:r ddicto can be joined only where 
the same plea cnn be pleaded and the same judgment given on 
each count, or whe1·e the counts nre of the same 
page 28 ~ nature nncl the same judgment can he rendered on 
all although the pleas to ench count were different; 
except where the fo11ns of action ex delicto h:we been abol-
ished, trespm;s vi rd armi.~ and trespass on the ense cannot 
he joined because the actions m·e of n different species. How-
ever, with the nbolition of the8e distinctions in the forms of 
artions ex ddict o, it no longer hc>t·on1es material on the ques-
tion of joinclcr of different cnnsC"s in trespass tlwf different 
forms of nction would have heen r('quired . at eommon law. 
Wl1en such is the cnse, the plaintiff may join as rnnny dis-
tinct and independ<'nt causes of :wtion ex d,•licto of the same 
nature as he may han, against the same person, or a~aiust 
\. 
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several defend;nts, if all are jointly liable for each c.ause of 
action, even though the different causes joined would have at 
common law been remedied by different forms of action. Un-
der such modifications of the Common law practice, a cause 
of action in trespass may be joined with a cause in tre~pass 
on/the case.'' . 
/Such is the practice now in Virginia by virtue of Section 
6086 of the Code. The prn<'tice of joining distinct causes of 
action in a single pleading is of common law origin. It has 
. been the policy of the law to permit and encourage joinder of 
action that are of the same nature and to be pursued in the 
same form of action in order to reduce litigation, the costs 
and for the convenience of the defendant. But it is to be 
noticed that the common law practice does not require the 
plaintiff to join such actions. It provides that be may do so. 
· In Burks, Pleading and Practice, 2nd Edition, 
page 29 } Page 141, the eminent authority on common law 
pleading says: "The general do<'trine is that de-
mands may he joined when they are of the same nature,· and 
the same judgment is to be given in all, notwithstanding the 
pleas may be different." 
And on· Page 915 he has this to say: '' Several actions of 
tort may be joined in the same action of trespass, but tort 
and contract cannot be united, nor can several species of ac-
tion be united in one declaration, although they may be all 
ex contract·u or ex delicto; thus, at common law trespass 
could not be united with case, but in Virginia it is declared 
by statute that wberever trespass would lie case may be 
brought. 8 • 0 It may also be observed that where the causes 
of action mig-bt have been united· in a single action, but the 
plaintiff has brougbt several actions, he may he compelled to 
consolidat(' them, and to pay the extra costs." 
Thus., the author, commenting· on the common law practice 
states that where the plaintiff has several causes of action he 
may join the several causos in one action, but nowhere does he 
Ray the plaintiff shall do RO, however, he may be requir.ed by 
the Court to consolidate the actions for the benefit of the de-
fendant and pay the extra <'Oids. Failure to pfead in the be-
b>ining, however, is not fatal to his declaration. 
The New York court in Rf'illy v. Sicilian Asphalt Pavin.Q 
Company, 170 N. Y. 40, 62 N. E. 772, 88 Am. St. Reports, 636, 
which supports the minority view says: " 11 . • • the history of 
the common law shows that the distinction between 
page 30 } torts to tl1e person and torts to property has always 
obtained. Lord ,Justice Bowen, in the Rrunsden 
ease; has pointed out that there is no autl10rity in the books 
for the proposition that a recovery for trespass to the person 
is a bar to an action for trespass to goods or vice versa." 
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Thus, the common law is that a person injured in both his 
person and property by the same negligent act of a defendant 
may, but he is not compelled, to join both ~laims for damages 
in the same action. Brunsden v. Humphrey, supra, i~t ere-
fore declaratory of the common law as it exists in En()' nd. 
Prior to the enactment of what is now Section 608 of the 
Code, a fine distinction was made between tres~a s and case, 
and the failure to plead prop·erly was fatal to the ction. Such 
fine distinction is clearly illustrated in Tayl r v. Rain.bow, 
2 Hen. & M. 423, which is the leading authority on the subject. 
The beaclnote in that case draws the distinction as follows:· 
"The distinction between trespass vi et armis, and trespass 
on the c~se 'for consequential dam!-lges, is this :-that where 
the act done is in itself an immediate injury to another's per-
son or property, there trespass vi et annis will lie, and not 
such action on the case; but where the act is not immediately 
injurious, but only by consequence, and collaterally, there no 
action of trespass vi et armis will lie, but a special action on 
the case for the damages consequent on such ~ct." 
l\Iany illustrations are given in. the opinion which was ren-
dered by Justice Roane and Justice Tucker. In the 
page 31 ~ course of his opinion, Justice Roane said: "Where 
the immediate act itself occasions a prejudice, or 
is an injury to the plaintiff's person, house, land, &c., the 
remedy is by action of trespass vi et annis; but, where the 
act itself is not an injury~ but a consequence from that act is 
prejudicial to the plaintiff's person, &c., his remedy is by an 
action on the cnse.'' 
In many of these cases the judges have declared the neces-
sity of keeping up the distinction, to avoid a confusion of ac-
tions. Iu an nutomohile collision damage to property is im-
mediate whereas damage to the person riding in the automo-
bile is conscquentinl. Applying the fine distinction between 
the two actions, trespass would lie in one and case in the 
otl1er. Tlms at <·ommon law, two 8eparate and distinct cause 
of actions are recognized. Under the common law praetice no 
ol·,jection seemed to ever have h<.>en made in splitting a cause 
of action, since no decisions on this point eau be found, the 
g·eneral prMticc being to object to a misjoincler of nctions, on 
which point many authorities ttrc to be found. In fMt, it 
would ap1war that nt <'ommon Jaw, tl1e bench and har recog--
nizecl the right of n plaintiff to irn;titutc separate H<!tions in 
cnse of in.iur;v to person and property arisill!~· out of n single 
net of negli_genl'e. It was~1 · until the event of tl1c automo-
bile that ~mch nctions he~ to nppear. in nny degree. The 
enactment of Section 608 J of the> Code, whieh was fir~t en-
acted in the C'ocle of 1849, nutt<>rinlly modified the rule as to 
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misjoiners. By this section it is prO\·idcd that in any case 
at ,vhich an action of trespass will lie, there may 
page 32 ~ be nmintained an action of trespass 011 the case, 
thus, remoying the difficulties at common law grow-
ing out of the fine distinctions between the cases in which 
trespass was the proper remedy and those in which the remedy 
was case. Speaking of this chang·e in tho/common law by the 
legislature, Justice Lee in Parsons v .. '11.arper, 16 Gratt. (57 
Va.) 64, said: "~<\nd being for matters which are made the 
subjects of counts in case by statute, there can be no· reason 
why they may not be properly united with others which' arc 
· nppropriatc at common law to the same action. * e e they 
have abolished in effect the distinction between these different 
causes of action in a declaration in case; for that they may 
be united hyifuch a declaration, is, as seems to me, a neces-
sary corollai·y from the provision wliich authorities cas,i to 
be maintained where the action of treRpass would also lie." 
The enactment of this statute, however, docs not require 
or compel a plaintiff to unite his cause of action in the same 
declaration, it merely provides that he may do so. 
"
7hile the fine distinction b('hvcen trespass and case is not 
material to the issue in the case at bar, I have gone into de-
tail for the purpose only of sliowing, that at common law, two 
separate causes of action were reco1rnized by the jurists and 
legal authorities. If they existed at common law they exist 
today unless changed by statute. Section 2, Code of Virginia, 
Foster v. Commomt1calth, suprn. The Legislature which is 
specially charged with the duty of making or amendin!{ the 
laws to meet their needs, has not at any time enacted any 
law changing- the rule of the common law with re-
page 33 ~ spect to the mattC'r und('l' considC'ration. The pre-
immption from the inaction of the Legislature is 
that it lms not found that tlte condition of the present pra,ctice 
1·equire any change or modifiC'ation of the rule. See Foster 
,._ Commonwealth, supra. 
In addition to the common lnw l'U](' or practice the mino1:it:v 
authorities recognize other reasons why a divisibl(' cause of 
action exists upon which a plaintiff may maintain separate 
actions. The leading authorities are the Brunsden case and 
the New York case of Rcillv v. Sicilian ~4stJhalt Pavin,q Co., 
siivra. ,vith 1·elation to injury to p('~. on and property, aris-
ing out of one single act of neg;lig('nee.it. is' said that in prop-
erty dmuagc the plaintiff mav · assign his' claim for damag-es, 
(>fit is subject: to the rigl1ts of his creditorfit is an asset tl1at 
would pass to nn assignee in bnnk1·uptcwsurvives tlrn death 
of either party, and the period of Jimitation is.five ~·ears. In-
jury to person, bowever,~annot he assignecP,"is not subject 
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to the rights of creditQJ;S.,,@lS not an asset in the hands of an 
assig~ in bankruptcyfdoes not survive the death of either 
party/'a'nd the period of limitation is one year. For these 
differences there must-a divisible cause of action, and it 
would be impractical and inconvenient in the _administration 
of justice to blend the two. In fact, there are instances when 
this is p(l,rlicularily true. If the demand is joined in tlie sam_e 
action and there is a general verdict, whiC'h is the rule, and 
the judgment- is attached by creditors of the plaintiff, how 
is the court to determine how much of the judgment is for 
- property damage and how much for personal in-
page 34 ~ juries. In the event of death and the actions are . 
. · joined by the administrator, what part can the 
court say goes to the widow and children free of the claims 
of creditors and what part Rhould go into the estate Etubject 
to the debts of the decedent. Even the majority autbol'ities 
recognize the right of a plaintiff to assign his property dam-
age and allow separate suit by the assignee. In Virginia an 
assignee may sue in his own name or in the name of his as-
signor. If the claim must he joined could a suit by an as-
signee in the name of his ast-ignor be maintained. 
"\Vhile there may be several answers to what has been said 
which would allow separate actions, in the case of death for 
instance of the plaintiff~ whereas, if the plaintiff, survived, 
only one action could be maintained, it must be conC'eded, that 
if a claim can be divided for one PU!l)OSe, it can be divided 
for any purpose. The claim is ne¢1:Ilelss divisible. 
Jones v. Morris Plan Bank, 168 Va. 284, 191 S. E. 608, is 
not contra. In that case the court had before it an indivisible 
contract for considerntion in which tl1e plaintiff attempted to 
split and maintain separate causes of action thereon. Tho 
decision of the court, holding the cause of action to be single. 
and indivisible was sonncl. Bnt that is not the <'ase here. Mr. 
,Justice Gregory, who delivered the opinion of the Court had 
this is say: "e $ " if the C'_)ntract is divisible, giving rise to 
more than one cause of achon eaeh may be proceeded upon 
separately.'' The test to he apvliccl is statecl to be as fol-
lows: "One of the principal tests in determining whether a 
demand is single and entire, or whether it is several, 80 as 
to give· rise to more than one C'ause of action, is 
page 35 ~ the. identity pf facts nPcessnry to maintnin the ac-
tion. If the same evidence will support both ac-
tions there is but one Ntuse of. action.'' 
The same evidence will not support both actions here as the 
cvi<lenl'e retating tO" the damage to property is different from 
the evidence relatin~ to injury 1o the person. Likewii~f:', the 
rnlc shltcd as the prinl'ipal test is not always C'Onclnsivc. In 
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applying the rule, the common law practice, which is the rule 
of decision, must not be overlooked. The court in the Jones 
case was also dealing with a single cause of action, and the 
court., in that case, fully recognized tlie right of a person to 
bring separate suits on separnte causes of action, subject to 
the power of the Court to order consoliµation, where possible. 
It is true that litigation must have an end and that no per· 
son should be unnecessarily lmrassed with a multiplicity of 
suits, but if tlle right is in the plaintiff to elect to sue scpa· 
mtely, there may be a good reason therefor, the defendant 
ought not be hem·d to complain. If the demand is divisible 
the lp.w is that separate snits may be maintained, subject to 
the power of the court to order n consolidation for the purpose 
of convenience, economy and substantial justice, but not if 
an injustice should result. 
It is suggested in the special pleas of the defendants tliat 
the plaintiff is stopped to maintain the second suit because the 
cause of action is founded on tl1e same automobile accident and 
the tortious acts. charged are identical with those upon which 
the plaintiff has bad judgment and satisfaction from the de· 
fendants. 
page 36 ~ The defendants' contentions is sound so fnr ns 
ii affects a single cause of action for the very doc· 
trine of splitting a cause of action is based on estoppel or 
res jurlicata.. See 30 Am .• Jur., .Judb"lllents, Section 173, Page ,..-
917. The rule does not apply, however, where the subject or ./ . 
demand· is divisible. /' 
In Vir,qin,ia Railway a11d Power Company v. Leland, 143 
Va. 920,129 S. E. 700, plaintiff was injured in an accident ,lue 
to tbe alleged negligenC'e of the defendant. His automobile 
was damaged in the same collh;ion. Suit was first instituted 
for th~ property damage which rNmlterl in a verdict for the 
defendant. He tl1ereafter instituted suit against the defend· 
ant for damages to the person. It was held that tbe first suit 
was res .iudicafa to the second i-uit. The reason assigned was 
that in the first suit it was deterri1ined that the negligence of 
the plaintiff was the proximate cause of the collision, and that 
it was conclusive of any l'ip:ht of recovery of damages to the 
person in any other action based upon the same canse of ac-
tion. . 
This case is not binding- on the facts here involved for tl1e 
reason Umt judgment in the first suit did not 1ro ag-ainst the 
plain~iff so ai. to establish his negligence as the proximate 
cause. Had judgment in th<' instant case in the first snit been 
in favor of the defendant, there would be no doubt that the 
plaintiff would 1Je barred or estopped to maintain the present. 
suit. The plaintiff having instituted the first suit the doctrine 
_ _______. 
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of estoppel cannot work against the defendant. Since this is 
a different cause of action, although arising out of 
page 37 ~ the same act of negligence, res judicata is not ap-
plicable. If it is, then it should apply against tho 
defendants rather than the plaintiff since the· proximate cause 
bas been established. However, the rule seems ne.ver· to havl~ 
been applied against a defendant to this ext~nt · The rule of 
estoppel just mentioned is very similar to t at adopted. by 
the Court in Eagle, etc., F-ire J.nsurance Co. . Heller, 149 Va. 
82, and is intended for situations therein mentioned rather 
than in instances here under consideration. In the Heller 
case.the 'plaintiff was not allowed to profit from his own wrong. 
There he had been convicted of setti])g fire to llis barn to col-
lect the fire insurance. -After his conviction he instituted suit 
against the defendant insurance compa11y to collect the fact 
amount of the policy. In denying him the right to recover, 
the doctrine of quasi cstoppel, amounting practically to res 
judicata, was ap. plied. Such application cann~t b invoked 
on the plaintiff in the instant case. He has e nothing 
whereby he should be estopped. See also Cap v. Whitson, 
157 Va. 46. 
It is to be noticed that in all these cases applying the doc-
trine of estoppel or res j1 icata, judgment in the first hi-
stance was against the aintiff. While a plaintiff cannot 
have but. one satisfncti 1 foi' tl10 same dnmage, Pa1nplin v. 
N. ti; W. Ra.ilway Co., LA Va. 254, 98 S. E. 51, he may institute 
separate actions for separate <'misc>s of action, or. if he elects, 
· he may join both in the same srtit. This, as shown: is the 
practice at common law and is now the law. 
page 38 ~ The real issue in thi!;; aetion is whether tbe de-
mand of the plahitiff is divisible. If it is J1e is 
11ot barred or estoppecl from maintaining separate actions. 
If tlie dcH1nnd is single and htdivisibfo, on}~, one action may 
he maintailled. This is n matter of public~ policy rather than 
cstoppcl or res :iudir:afa. . 
It is not necessary to elnhorate further. The first ground 
of the demurrer will he sn~tnin<'d, with lf'll\'<' to the defendant 
to plencl further. An order to this effeet will he entered when 
pre~entecl. This opihion is mad<' a part of tlw r<'cord. in this 
)) roceecli ng. 
Respectfully, 
l~ARL L. A RB OTT, .Jndge. 
September 18, 1947. 
I 
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And now at this day to-wit: 
At a Circuit Court continued ancl l1eld in the County of 
Alleghany at the Court House tliereof on the 23rd day of 
February, 1948. 
. r acob B. lfinkle, Plaintiff 
v. 
ORDER . 
Bishop Edward Carter and Thomas ,villiam Smith, .Tr. 
15 DAY NOTICE. 
This day came the parties by their attorneys, and a jury 
being demanded, thereupon came a jury of seven persons of 
this County, drawn, summoned and selected in the manner 
directed by law, to-wit: Grant Loekhart, Robt. Lee Knighton, 
Everett F. Sellers, J. Frank Sizer, Jr., Virgil Harman, C. M. 
Patteson ancl and II. R. Powers to whom there was 
page 39 ~ no objection and who were sworn the truth to speak 
upon the issues joined, and hnving heard the evi~ 
dence and argument of counsel, retired from the bar to con-
sider of thei:r verdict, and after sometime returned into Court 
and upon their oaths say, "'Ve the jury find in favor of the 
plaintiff and against the defendants and fix llis damages at · 
$1,000.00'' and the jury are discharged. And the def end ant 
moves the Court that the verdict of the jury be set aside as 
heing contrary to tht' law ancl evidenee, and for error of the 
Court in sustaining a demurrer to the speeial plea of each de-
fendant and the Court cloth overrule this motion, to whic11 
action of the Court the defendant excepts. It is the judgment 
of this Court that the plaintiff Jacob B. Hinkle do have and 
recover of Bishop Edward Carter and Thos. William Smith, 
.r r., the sum of $1,000.00 with interest at the rate of 6% from 
this date and the ('Ost on ltis he]ialf expe11ded. The <lefendant 
having indicated to tlte Court that they intend to appeal to 
the Supreme Court of Appeals for writ of error to the judg-
ment of the Court in this proceeding, on t11eir motion it is 
ordered that execution be suspended for a period of sixty 
davs upon the defendant or someone for them, 'within fifteen 
days from this date, executin~ a suspending Bond in the 
penalty of $1,500.00 conclit~oned as t~e law direc.ts. It is fur-
ther ordered fl}at in the event a writ of error 1s p:ranted to 
the def endnnt by the Supreme Court of App<.'als of Virginia 
that the su·spending bond executed by the deft'ndant l>e con-
tinued and constitute~ the suspending bond in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
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Y!lf !tllP-:Y. qe~t11 ~?:~H = , 
~ F~ E. Dillard, Clerk of the Circuit Court of the County 
of Alleghany, State of Virgi:nia, do hereby certify that the 
foregoing is a true transcript-or the record and proceedings 
in a certain proceeding lately pending in @{li~ ~R»~t U!}UP,f tile 
style of Jacob B. Hinkle, Plaintiff, v: l3isliop Edward'Cgrter 
atn~ ~~.emt.~~ Wi!!itP.! ~mUJia' !T r:,t!9~fe~~,P.~~! af, tn~ !~lltf ~~1· ~ 
ranscr1p was mane up an cer mecl uy me n er no 1ce o 
the plaintiff's Attorn~v ~s r~J:iul· r~d by; Seetion 6339 of the 
Code of Virginia. ,.'I • · • · • · 
· qtv~~ ~~d~f J!l},' ~qpq Hifs Wtp d~y qf Mm:c~, 1~¥1· 
.• 
f: ~= flIHHRD,! P.l~r~: 
f9~ ff?.r ~~pqrfl ~~~.00. 
A C~rpY-:-:-+r~tP ~ 
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